



Apoplexy of Democracy in the D. R. Congo's Politics

Nganda Fabrice Enga,¹ Lohata Tambwe O. Paul-René²

¹ PhD candidate, Institute of China and Asia-Pacific Studies, National Sun Yat-sen University, Taiwan, (R.O.C). E-mail: e.fanganda@gmail.com

² Distinguished Professor, Graduate Institute of Political Science and Public Administration, College of Social Sciences, Université de Kinshasa (UNIKIN); Université Libre de Kinshasa (ULK) & Institut Supérieur des Techniques Médicales (ISTM)/ Kinshasa; Editor in Chief of Journal Approach (SSCEPLC), D.R. Congo,

E-mail: lohatapaulrene@gmail.com

Abstract

This essay attempts to conceptualize the 'Apoplexy of Democracy' by analysing 'pathological abnormalities' in the Democratic Republic of Congo's Politics. Using the 'Relative and Reflexive Lens' (R.R.L.), the study introduces and adds 'Genetic Statenescopy' to the on-going debate on the Afrocentric perspectives of change and continuity in Sub-Saharan Africa's democracies. Discussing the implications of pathological abnormalities on government's performance, the study argues that the more centripetal forces of pathological abnormalities increase, the less centrifugal logic of democracy operates. As a result, the 'apoplexy of democracy'. Democracy becomes severely apoplectic when the degree of centripetal characteristics is extreme. Consequently, it is likely that the poor government performance leads to rift and failure of the resource-abundant states that, thirty years after it first launched its democratization process, still displaying negative performances.

Keywords: Apoplexy of Democracy, Pathological Abnormalities, Genetic Statenescopy, Relative and Reflexive Lens, Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Introduction

It is not only in illiberal democracies, fragile States, or the arguably non-stable African democracies that 'State Power' -as a centripetal body force to the political organization- operates under the yoke of centrifugal polyarchic gravity. Corsica in France, Spain's Basque, and Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom all evolve in the well-known Western liberal democracies where Weberian state-building issues -with a double monopoly of physical violence and legitimate symbolism- have become less relevant. However, what is new here is that construction of the modern state and its weakening paradoxically co-occur. Several modern democracies have long experienced the Weberian-State ideal-type and no longer face survival issues. In contrast, in most Sub-Saharan Africa's democracies, the centrifugal antidemocratic weight remains more potent than the centripetal democratic logic. This results in poor government performance leading to fragile States' balkanization. The DR. Congo's case illustrates this point clearly although Katoka (2018:7), exploring the DR. Congo's socio-economic metrics performance, highlights in the same vein as Frankel (2012:19) the resource curse theory to explain D.R. Congo's paradox of plenty: having abundant natural resources while performing less economic growth. Intense academic debates have been developed to explain the adversity of resource curse's outcomes that can be sectarian (Venables, Anthony J., 2016:161-184) or avoidable to some countries under certain conditions (Ross, Michael R., 2015: 239-259). That is not the aim of this study.

A brief sketch of D.R. Congo reveals that Congo is generously endowed with abundant natural resources, on 2.3 million squared kilometres of a vast territory containing hundreds of thousand minerals including but not limited to copper, cobalt, tin, diamonds, gold, coltan, uranium, cassiterite, zing. It is the third most populated democracy and the biggest in Sub-Saharan Africa having enormous natural resources and agricultural potential of over eighty million square kilometres of well-watered, arable and grazing lands, and the second-biggest rainforests

in the world after Brazil. 80% of coltan and 10% of copper, respectively the highly worldwide demanded resources in high-tech industry are from D.R. Congo.

However, sixty years after the D.R. Congo acceded to independence and won back its freedom from seventy-five years of harsh and bloody Belgian colonialization, plus thirty years after was first launched its democratization, the D.R. Congo still, until recently, stands among fragile and most underdeveloped States, in extreme poverty, with less democracy, and worse development. Although it was strongly tinged with the negation of the Congolese's civil and political rights, the Weberian model of State inherited from the Belgian colony has nearly disappeared from DR Congo. Currently occupied by more than seven foreign armies, more than one hundred forty armed groups -cutting off the territory from controlling its most useful eastern arc, from North to South, and serving as a centre for the plundering of all its energy, capacities, and resources by neighbouring countries backed by Western powers, DR Congo has become a tattered State turning its socio-economic fabric to shreds, and unable to create a system that generates an economic surplus that can be redistributed and reinvested in the country for its development.

In addition, with a G.D.P. of barely 50 billion, an annual budget of less than 5 billion used essentially for consumption, less reasonable expenses for more than 85 million inhabitants living without water - the rate of water supply being the lowest in Africa with less than 20% -, without electricity. Yet the country has tremendous hydroelectric potential to electrify the entire African continent. Of this meagre budget, very little if nothing is allocated to agriculture (less than 1%), a little to health (less than 5%), and lesser amounts to investment. The latter's annual rate not being executed at 10%. This turns the country into a truly slave State amongst others with a potent unpaid wages issue: civil servants and public sector workers buckling down, hardly manage to earn a livelihood; soldiers killed in action on the battlefields with no remuneration, whereas private-sector workers are getting paid peanuts. This clearly questions the value of freedom and democracy in the D.R. Congo.

To address that issue this study calls for a pressing and comprehensive awareness-raising for implementing realistic programs and adequate policies to mobilize local resources conducive to economic liberation. However, the patrimonial and clientelistic reinterpretation of western liberal democracy in the D.R. Congo constitutes a significant barrier to mobilizing the *primus inter pares* around a joint program conducive to massive changes. The demise of the neo-patrimonial vestiges in the D.R. Congo's conception and perceptions of democracy -made of numerous pathological abnormalities resulting in the apoplexy of democracy- remains vital to see the mobilization being effective around healthy ideas and convictions to rebuilding the State and its economy, thereby tackling the paradox of plenty.

Apart from external factors, especially the influence of colonial rule, the imposed-war for plundering DR Congo's natural resources, including the pressure of the international constraints on domestic politics either through linkage to the West or Western leverage (Levitsky & Lucan, 2010:3-37, 85-87, 309), internal factors -here explored as pathological abnormalities- have significant impacts on State coercive capacity, economic development, and democratic performance. For this study, the primary responsibility lies with the modernizing political elites in a permanent and drastic turmoil of exemplarity.

The central argument here explores the relationship between pathological abnormalities and apoplexy of democracy at domestic level. Through an in-depth examination of how modern democracy operates in the D.R. Congo, the paper uses the 'Relative and Reflexive Lens' approach from which 'Genetic Statenescopy' is developed as the sound frame of the R.R.L.'s political window, which is a holistic and complementary approach to analyse and thereafter, providing a comprehensive explanation on Sub-Saharan Africa's politics in general, and in particular, making intelligible the seemingly complex State-based issues in the D.R. Congo's Politics. This, in response to numerous Western-centric approaches attempting to address the complexity of socio-political phenomenon in African politics only from a narrow and single angle.

Genetic Statenescopy through R.R.L. constitutes an essential contribution to the ongoing debates on Afrocentric approaches in the study of change and continuity in politics of nonstable Sub-Saharan Africa's democracies. Applied in this essay, it introduces and discusses the conceptual and typological aspects of apoplexy and pathological abnormalities in Democracy's Flexibility Literature (Shapiro, 1999), focusing in particular on their characteristics analysis and operational applicability to the D.R. Congo's case, and the possibility of thinking their generalizability to other arguably unstable African democracies.

Conceptual and Theoretical Perspectives

1. *Genetic Statenescopy (G.S.)¹ and Reflexive and Relative Lens (R.R.L.)*

Political phenomenon, seen as a 'total social fact' (Mauss, 1966), methodologically conflicts with simplistic and reductionist approaches. The R.R.L. was precisely initiated in reaction to certain 'western-centric' reductionist approaches that, defining the State in Africa as the expression of the belly's politics (Bayart, 2009:10), the alternate name of 'neo-patrimonial State' (Medard, 2002), or as a 'Soft State' (Myrdal, 1967:118-134) or as a 'Peripheral

State' (Petras, 2008:415-431) address African politics phenomena from a single analytical framework. R.R.L. however, although it intends to be an Afrocentric approach, was critically and selectively influenced by other most influential epistemological and methodological precautions, notably the Ideal Type of M. Weber (Psathas, 2005) in that, characteristics of a given phenomenon can be essential or accidental, depending on the research perspective (whether it is political, economic, social or cultural), the researcher's position and the aim of the study; the Relativity of A. Einstein; the Regionalism of N. Poulantzas (Jessop, 2002) according to which phenomena can be recessive today and dominant tomorrow; the Falsification of K. Popper rejecting the classical inductivist view on scientific method in the sense that scientific outcomes are not dogmatic since the empirical falsification remains the sacrosanct rule; and lastly, the Structural Constructivism of P. Bourdieu (Garth, 2016:1091-1113).

Lohata (2010) defines his 'R.R.L.' approach as follows:

'through a scientific window or a position of his choice or by circumstances, the researcher's lenses emit inquisitiveness signals toward the research object or the subject of observation. The latter reacts by sending reflexive light (or sound) back to the researcher or elsewhere. This light or sound includes a variety of multi-coloured rays. Some are stunning or dominant colours; others are recessive or less perceptible. The researcher will then retain both actual and less significant colours rather than focusing on the irreparable existing ones. In this way, he will thus proceed before comparing the outcomes using one or more windows, including political, economic, social, or cultural. The researcher can settle for one window, but as a fundamental pre-requisite, he should declare it and considers his outcomes as provisional and deliberately partial. This first step will result in data collection, processing, and case study. The second step consists of organizing, orienting, interpreting, explaining results, and selecting cases, identifying all trends by the problem, objectives, and hypotheses. Lastly comes the publication: all identified trends will thus be presented as the main title (research title), a secondary title (chapter), and subtitles (section, paragraph, point, etc.). Contrary to M. Weber's model (Ideal-type) which only retains the essential, the L.R.R. suggests a theoretical model that is more complex and closer to African realities and, finally, revisable (...).'ⁱⁱ

For the case under study, R.R.L. approach is perfectly suitable given its complexity and flexibility: actors, behaviours, regimes, practices, and political significance vary from place to place, time to time, and perspective to perspectives. Diverse perspectives can arise from the political window. The one for this paper is Genetic Statenescopy developed here not as an autonomous or competing approach to the R.R.L., rather, it is the sturdy frame of the RRL political window solely related to the more extensive, systematic and internal diagnostic of cumulative state-based system of knowledge and practices.

In this regard, governmentologists, transitologists, deliverologists, consolidologists, governmentologists, or governometrists can all look at the issue under study from the same RRL political window but through their own perspectives leading to different, complementary or competing outcomes.

The concept of Genetic Statenescopy refers to a thorough holistic analysis of intrinsic and endogenous determinants of pathological abnormalities of political, social, economic, and judicial systems, institutions, actors and behaviours –both organizational and operational spectra included–. Statenescopy is coined by uniting State and Scopia. It examines the State as a type of polity from both stateness and statehood dimensions. This study focuses on the stateness dimension, referring to as the State's ability to maintain its territory, preserve its nation, and sustain the prosperity of its citizens. Statehood dimension exploring extrinsic and exogenous parameters -including the international recognition and acceptance as an independent State, capable to participate and engage with other players on the international scene, as part of nations' concert- draws little attention to this essay's perspective.

The study links Genetic and Statenescopy for it assumes that the matrix of bad, low, or weak governance and failure of the State lies in its nefarious genesis. Genetic here refers to congenital or fundamental issues inherent in the origination, functioning, and survival of existing institutions, systems, norms, structures, and actors in a given State, for instance, a democratic one. The essay does not establish any dichotomy between Genetic Statenescopy as a thorough holistic analysis of State-based issues and any of the various species found in the R.R.L.'s political window including the new institutional perspectives notably historical, sociological, or rational choice among others. It remains open to systems, regulation, and interpretive perspectives.

This essay broadens the theoretical scope of the concept of Genetic Statenescopy beyond institutional approaches. The political significance of the issue under study calls for a systemic-functional and culturist approach, which considers that culture can serve as a brake or a lever for development. This brings more luminescence capable of producing adequate solutions with expansive, systemic, and sustainable outcomes in actors' behaviours, State systems, and society's culture. In this study, the emphasis is relatively placed in the relationship between institutions and actors. It attempts to conceptualize the D.R. Congo's apoplexy of democracy from the political elite's culture, seen through their behaviours. How principles, actions, rules, procedures, values,

identities, arrangements, behaviours, in short, the culture of political elites within institutions, shape, explain, or determine outcomes over time, at micro, meso, or macro level.

It appears that, in D.R. Congo, the culture of mediocrity, passivity, incompetence, idleness, and enjoyment resulting from pathological abnormalities which long characterized political elites' behaviours through corruption, cronyism, patronage, nepotism, political vagrancy, party faction and duplication, and ethnicity are conducive to the spontaneous loss of democratic values and the severe onset of the exemplary leadership crisis in political elites, two key components defining the apoplexy of democracy as a disease of the State's cardiovascular system. The apoplexy of democracy is the dependent variable, and pathological abnormalities are independent variables. The study assumes that when centripetal forces of pathological abnormalities are overbalanced, the result is the 'apoplexy of democracy.' If the centrifugal logic of democracy is lopsided, there is likely a fragile State's rift and failure. Democracy is severely apoplectic when the degree of centripetal or centrifugal characteristics is extreme. This gives rise to severely apoplectic centrifugal and severely apoplectic centripetal democracies. Both cases, severely apoplectic centripetal and severely apoplectic centrifugal democracies, are likely to lead to the State's failure. Nevertheless, beyond any analytical deficiencies, argumentative cracks, or interpretative gap that might appear into the Genetic Statenescopy's perspective, it should be noted that the main aim intends to contribute significantly to the intelligibility of important State-based issues critically assessed from inside.

2. *Apoplexy of Democracy*

Apoplexy is a medical term. Engelhardt (2017:449-453) notes that it is a long-known condition explored since the pre-mid- and post-Hippocrates eras (Schutta, 2006:250-268). Apoplexy's definition was relatively stable in the pre-autopsies era, from Antiquity (Karenberg, 2015:186-200) to Renaissance (Pereira, 2015:127-130), an overall concept. Consecutively to the emergence of autopsies, 'apoplexy' was redefined in the modern era to develop the concept 'stroke' incorporating all historical acquisitions inherited from 'apoplexy' known as a disease in which the patient abruptly collapses, becomes unconscious, motionless, and displaying cardiorespiratory disorder. For Pound & al. (1997:331-337), apoplexy is 'characterized by a consciousness prompt disappearing, multiple cerebral dysfunctions, with various disorders, next labelled as intense brain's accidents, -vascular or not-'. In addition, Mott (1911:195-196) argues that apoplexy's general acceptance supposes an immediate trouble of consciousness, responsiveness, and motion with no major change in cardiovascular and respiratory functions due to cerebral disorder.

In the same vein as Mott, Pound, and Engelhardt, this study associates apoplexy with democracy to explore some pathological abnormalities in the D.R. Congo's democracy. In the assumption that democracy is a cardiovascular system of the State's body, apoplexy to democracy is broadly seen as a disease to the State's cardiovascular system. Exploring pathological abnormalities in the D.R. Congo's cardiovascular system implies then, the in-depth examination of conditions that involve democracy's dysfunction leading to State failure.

Numerous contributions to the burgeoning study of democracy have attempted to establish the pluralistic theory to conceptualize democracy in terms of polyarchy (Dahl, 1971:17). Some examined what is sufficient for democracy (Przeworski, 2010:44-59, 99-122, 125-145), exploring self-Government limits. Others challenged the mutual exclusive and collectively exhaustive by contrasting democracy with non-democracy (Geddes, 1999:115-144), pointing out problems of transition process and consolidating democracy (Linz and Stepan, 1996:38-48), exploring mixed political regimes that, mixing authoritarian governance with democratic standards (Levitsky and Way 2002:51-66) stress issues of 'elections without democracy.' Several concepts have been developed to label hybrid regime-types in terms of 'semi-democratic,' 'virtual democratic,' 'electoral democratic,' 'pseudo-democratic,' 'illiberal democratic,' 'non stable democracy,' 'semi-authoritarian,' 'soft authoritarian,' 'electoral authoritarian,' or 'partly free' -no matter in the transitional moves towards the democratic or authoritarian direction they may be (Terry, 1995:72-87; Case, 1996:437-464; Richard, 1998:3-17). In addition, Mitchell & Simmons (1995:30-38) examined the pathological politics in government failure's anatomy; whereas Eoin (1929:96-112) analysed the democracy's pathology with special mention on how rigid or flexible constitutions deal with individual liberty. Based on the actor's interactions, Przeworski A. (1991:10-31), exploring the economical and political reforms in Latin America and Eastern Europe, demonstrates in his study of market and democracy how personal calculation as a predictor matters. Putman R. & al. (1993:3-63, 121-181), to make democracy work, examine the civic traditions in modern Italy through conditions for creating string, responsive, and effective representative institutions.

The above flourishing literature backs up the rationale behind this attempt to conceptualize the apoplexy of democracy from the recurrent state of democratic unconsciousness and the incapacity of the political elites to consciously control their behaviour to favour democratic values, providing the State with strong political, social, cultural, economic, and judicial institutions capable of promoting sustainable development and consolidating its independence. Institutions here are understood in both aspects of norms and structures for managing the common

destiny. In contrast, Political Elite in this study refers to any politician, men or women, whose intrinsic values give them the competence to understand, invent, rally around a tremendous national ambition, and lead political actions.

In other words, when the lack of attachment to the general interest, culture of effort and discipline, culture of excellence and meritocracy, plus the inability to have a real vision for the nation and the State characterize political elites within a democracy, the latter becomes apoplectic. Democracy – seen here, as J. Djoli (2020) stresses, from the cultural perspectives – as a culture in which the opposition is accepted as a technique of government that is systematically and rationally structured. Democracy understood as the vitality of thought, freedom of debate and expression, the art of presenting convincing arguments and being contradicted. Conversely, the apoplexy of democracy creates the mechanic majority, which operates like in a totalitarian regime-type giving no room to the real political opposition. It manufactures artificial majorities and fake oppositions without alternatives, incapable of designing a matrix pattern of political, economic, and judicial reforms in the light of the constitutional referential-framework.

Apoplexy of democracy generates a manducatory system that boils down to sharing public enterprises^{vi} in terms of prebends or remuneration where the State portfolio is transformed into a reclassification centre for family members, relatives, and friends at the expense of the whole community. Here, political parties are like fragmented and atomistic groupings serving individuals for the distribution of political power, where the creator of parties, – called Moral Authorities–, own the minds of parties' members and define themselves as outlaws, subjectively appointing and hiring whenever, wherever, and whomever they want basing on tribalization and kinship politics. Nevertheless, kinship is consanguinity, that is, irrationality and lacks objectivity used as a matrix of development. As a result, there is a severe deficit of thought, debate, and project in all institutions into the same mould of sociological production, including the highly politicized civil society, universities, churches, etc.

In this respect, D. Sesanga (2020) notes that, the ability to mobilize political elites around a real project for integral and sustainable change becomes biased by the clientelistic and patrimonial vision of State. No few but less valuable and tangible signs of political will –from the political elites to rally around healthy ideas and convictions to rebuild the State– are being shown for improving governance, the rule of law, revitalizing the economy, or reconstructing infrastructures, necessary social facilities. Instead, there is massive and robust mobilization solely for self-serving partisan interests. Hence, ‘corporatism’ invades and affects all sectors, including the Justice sector, which becomes highly ‘corporocratic’. With such a type of justice, any misdeeds committed by the administrators of justice evade punishment or prosecution.

Besides, justice's independence is highly challenged by the permanent interference of the executive body in the judiciary. The minister of justice has a vast power of injection extended to the disciplinary level, giving him the possibility to issue an injunction to the hierarchical superior of the judge responsible of any case to take provisional sanctions against the latter, so that, when a magistrate of the public prosecutor's office has received that order to prosecute and refuses or misses to do so with his utmost conviction –given he has the power to assess the appropriateness of prosecution– the charge is automatically held against him for disciplinary misconduct.ⁱⁱⁱ

Corporatism and politicization of justice constitute among others both significant cause and consequence of the apoplexy of democracy in which Justice and the whole Administration have an appalling and execrable image that, on the electoral issue, it is common to see the constitutional court invalidate, revalidate, counter-validate, de-validate one or more candidates who were previously declared by the electoral commission as temporarily elected. The electoral commission is independent only by name but essentially composed of politicians, representatives of political parties, delegates of civil society, and religious components. Those figure members are not independent since they are appointed in the name and on behalf of their respective components, sometimes without professional competence and moral consistency. The danger is this, due to corruption; the electoral commission officials provide election outcomes that do not genuinely reflect the democratic expression of voters. This often leads to the post-election crisis of political legitimacy creating political bickering, squabbles between politicians, between the executive and the legislature, within the legislature, between the legislature and the judiciary, etc., this with multiple adverse consequences such as institutional instability, rebellions, assassinations of political leaders, anarchy, coup d'état, etc. Then the State becomes butchered, dismembered, cut up by external powers through imposed wars of invasion and occupation for economic exploitation. This depicts the case of DR Congo's apoplexy of democracy which fosters a culture of mediocrity that claps the political community and all segments of society. In contrast, the culture of efficiency for disappears in favour of enjoyment's culture for the ruling class, which enslaves the State and society to its interests.

Characteristics Analysis

Pathological abnormalities explaining the sudden onset of exemplary leadership crisis and spontaneous loss of democratic consciousness and values within the D.R. Congo's political elites' behaviours have made a fundamental break with the fathers of independence's customs and traditions. In May 1960, under the Parliamentary System, Patrice Emery Lumumba won the most seats with his allies and became the D.R. Congo's first prime minister.

However, to prove his strong commitment to republican and democratic values, he called the Parliament, owing to the general interest, to vote for his political opponent Joseph Kasavubu as the first President of the First Republic of the D.R. Congo. To make known its commitment to the values of integrity and republican morality, Kasavubu refused to get rich at the Congolese people's expense and died poor. Well before that, in January 1959, Congolese participants in the Belgo-Congolese Roundtable conference demanded and thereby obtained from the Belgian colonial government the liberation and the participation of Patrice Emery Lumumba in the conference forthwith.

This illustrates the sign of patriotism and fair competition that could have led the D.R. Congo to a real modern democracy and development, on the opposite assumption of Przeworski & al. (2000)^v that development and democracy are supposed to go hand in glove with no risk of being separated. Ironically though, the Belgian imperialism got involved dividing them to exploit better and dominate the D.R. Congo. Unlike that previous, brief but successful experience with the first pre-independence political elites characterized by their organic political attitude (Gramsci, 1971: 117) for committing themselves in favour of independentist causes for the D.R. Congo, post-independence, pro-democratic and current political elites are generally distinctive by their corruption, manufacturing, and manipulation of the so-called ethnic struggles, and the 'oligarchization' of social life clouded by predation, selfishness, nepotism, clientelism and pure patrimonialism. Ever since the independence, political elites at the imperialism instigation have succeeded in liquidating democracy by eliminating physically and politically Patrice Emery Lumumba, the legal and legitimate winner of the first and the only democratic elections -free, fair, and non-subject to fraud- the D.R. Congo had ever known.^{vi} Political elites became then complicit in the Mobutist totalitarian and dictatorial regime of the second Republic, being at the same time talkers and listeners, speakers and recipients, ideologues and relays of the formless ideology of authenticity that is inherently oppressive, intolerant, and economically depleting for thirty-two years.

In addition, the AFDL regime of Laurent-Desire Kabila in the Third Republic, despite good intentions and all hopes of renewal raised at the outset, ultimately betrayed with the collusion of the Mobutist and so-called 'modernizing' political elites. This has resulted in war of invasion and occupation, general and growing insecurity in eastern D.R. Congo, plus the deliberate option to establish a de facto one-party rule. Congolese people faced a dreadful period in the wake of the legendary mediocrity of Joseph Kabila regime lasting 18 years: economic misery, spurious elections, political opponents imprisoned or forced into exile, systemic mass violation of human rights, the proliferation of armed rebel movements in the East; the D.R. Congo and its people dispossessed with their wealth and mineral. From the above-mentioned, it can be asserted that Congolese political elites since the independence have moved away from the people's concerns. They have long showed a deficit of exemplary leadership and loss of democratic consciousness and republican values. In the following section, the essay explores corruption as the principal pathological abnormality. Clientelism, nepotism, duplication of parties, political vagrancy, and ethnicity are consubstantial, complementary, mutually reinforcing the pathological abnormalities and jointly leading to the apoplexy of democracy.

1. Principal pathological abnormality

(1) Corruption

Simply put, corruption is an anti-value, a perversion of morals, perverseness of accepted standard of behaviour, moral depravity that pervades and eats away at the whole Congolese society. There is nothing unusual in the D.R. Congo seeing public official or civil servants making money from public services, academic authorities converting into cash school grades, or health authorities monetizing health care through patients, or product diversion from patients, police and judiciary monetizing freedom in exchange to money or other favours, for totally selfish and personal reasons. Public officials confuse State property with their own: a typical 'neo-patrimonial' that refuses to apply rational rules in delivering public services. Medard (2000:75-87) contrasts two forms of corruption: petty and grand corruption. The latter is profit-oriented, including embezzlement or economic crimes; the former is a compensatory practice for the shortfall or loss of income. The lack of purchasing power leads the civil servants to get paid on the State's back. Both types of corruption are perverse: grand corruption deprives the State of the significant resources needed for its development; petty corruption psychologically destabilizes the citizen or the individual notably. Both are fuelled by impunity and professionalization or career. In D.R. Congo, police authorities, civil servants, magistrate, and politicians all behave in the same way. Normally, Public administration, seen as a 'multidimensional actor' (Chevallier,1999:8) would likely be conducive to economic progress since it is present in all stages of management and decision-making. This explains why some countries less well-endowed in natural resources, such as Switzerland, Japan, South Korea, or Taiwan, are highly developed -most probably due to the efficiency and the effectiveness of their public administration. Quite the contrary in the D.R. Congo, Public Administration is both the victim and actor of the overall underdevelopment:

Firstly, there is a serious problem of control and supervision of staff headcounts and quality of statutory State employees. Corruption is fuelled by the overestimation of civil servants' number to whom the State pays a monthly salary. This number includes: real civil servants, retired, deceased, and dismissed civil servants, on whose behalf some greedy people unduly receive financial entitlements and remuneration normally reserved for active civil servants. Besides, there are also strange individuals and fictitious employees recorded with Personnel ID or with duplicated service numbers in the public administration, including those obtaining undue advantages due to their false and misleading information^{vi}. Lastly, the period of non-active status for officials is, in fact, unlimited. Overlapping or 'cumulation,' that is, holding concurrently multiple posts, plus incompatibilities are commonplace. Attention should be drawn to the conditions of recruitment. The latter is neither rational nor universal, rather particularistic and parochial in the D.R. Congo. Recruitment is made even for the highest grade in the category of command or for the most senior officials, contrary to the legal and statutory provisions. Moreover, it is now more than twenty years since the last recruitment competition for civil servants has been organized, though people are still being hired in the public service. All these dysfunctions result in the enlargement of the financial envelope covering false recruitments, incorrect promotions, and the pay of non-existent units.

The control of staff headcounts and officials' quality supervision can generate possible savings to fund and motivate the entire staff. Currently, approximately three-fourths of Public Service's budget finances those who are not entitled to it. Last but not least, public officials are most known for trafficking and tampering with administrative documents and all State property. The transport sector, Land sector, foreign affairs sector, and financial sectors are not exempt from this principal pathological abnormality. While the administration is running out of stock, items such as number plates, identity cards, passports, driving licenses, etc., are sold on the black market by private individuals in large quantities. Specialized administrations, including the security administration, are affected by the same phenomenon. Arrangements between parliamentarians and public services are commonplace for under-estimating tax revenues, with no public service criteria (Lohata, 2010).

Corruption in the D.R. Congo entails multiple and negative consequences, including discrimination, social injustice, the high production cost of raw materials, and the scarcity of budgetary resources for the State. In addition to the minimization of resources, the development of inequalities, corruption feeds political dependence, clientelism, social injustice, underdevelopment, the alarming decrease in the State's educational level, legal insecurity, etc.

In conclusion, corruption in the D.R. Congo is twofold: an infringement, an offense as such, a sign of poor education, and disability, a cancer causing much harm to the whole society. Never has a society been so openly corrupted as the D.R. Congo. Grand and petty corruption are fervently competing with one another. There is a large discrepancy between political rhetoric and reality. Political elites are all claiming morality and justice, yet they are always acting contrary to their claims in practice. Administration, political milieu, military, and police circles; religious institutions; educational institutions, sport institutions, private and associative sectors only live of corruption. Children grow up with, buying grades from elementary school to university. Legal provisions that vigorously combat corruption exist, though never executed. Such a typical anomie. Corruption has become an intoxicating lure, a real addiction for many political elites. The example of road harassment by the traffic police is an eloquent illustration of this.

Thus, in this essay, D.R. Congo's Genetic Stenescopy illustrates the political elite's corruption as the fundamental pathological abnormality conducive to the apoplexy of democracy. Although complementary and at equal value, strongly connected, the rest of the indicators remain consubstantial part of the former. Corruption as a pivotal pathological abnormality reflects both bad education, -an offense liable to criminal penalties set forth- and disease in the form of drug addiction. In such a society, where abnormalities are pathologically turned into normalcy, democracy becomes severely apoplectic.

2. Complementary pathological abnormalities

(1) Clientelism

As previously mentioned, political elites in the D.R. Congo have long excelled in the lack of civic culture^{vii}, developing an exaggerated desire to conserve power by capturing institutions. Briquet (2015) notes that Clientelism is one of political pathologies that explain the malfunctioning of democracy and political system's anomaly that blocks emergence and lasting legitimation. This is the fact that political parties behave like bosses and their members like clients. This paper presents clientelism as an unequal and dyadic relationship, where the boss decides, and clients receive, a real dependent and lasting relationship. Political parties monopolize all the advantages, keeping at bay citizens who are not their members. The expression 'vertical and horizontal sharing' of public jobs in the D.R. Congo – during the post-war transition period: 2003-2006-was based on clientelism. The Sun City conference^{viii} attendees have shared all the political and administrative positions only amongst themselves ignoring the rest of the D.R. Congolese who had not taken part in the conference. However, until today no change

has been observed so far.^{ix} The competition design to fill administrative positions in the National School of Administration, E.N.A., the Magistracy, and Public services currently organized after more than 20 years of omission, solely benefit the members and allies of F.F.C. as in the time of the president Mobutu with the M.P.R., the State-Party; everything happening in the total confusion and overlap between the State and the party. Consequently, this study argues that clientelism privatizes the State, politicizes the administration, including the public services, and in a pejorative sense bureaucratizes the State apparatus. Clientelism explored here in terms of relationship between the boss and his clients, whose social and economic status is unequal and whom moral obligation impose the reciprocal exchange of goods and services (Briquet, 2015), is falsely adopted in the D.R. Congo by political elites as an approach and practice in managing public State's affairs.

(2) Nepotism, Cronyism and Patronage

It is not unusual to observe political elites managing public affairs based on kinship with no rational basis. Consanguinity has long been the keyword in ministerial offices and public services. The last general elections organized in 2018 illustrate well this statement. Many principal candidates aligned their family members, children, spouses, and relatives as alternate candidates. It was common to see political parties nominating members from same influential families to compete for the same constituency, appointing one candidate for the Senate, the same candidate for the National Assembly and the Provincial Assembly. In turn, the candidate aligns his spouse and children as alternative candidates to all these levels of competition so that when he wins those seats based on unfair and corrupted elections, his whole family gets employed, and the party wins the seats. The candidate who brings more seats to the party has priority to be appointed for ministerial office and appoint his relatives for public services. Thus, with this pathological system, it is ubiquitous to find in one family the father as a minister or governor, his spouse a senator, the first son a parliament member, the concubine or relative a public official. Such a 'dynastization' of political life, a real return to absolutist empires and kingdoms with the same families holding the whole community's power and economy.

(3) Duplication, Faction and Vagrancy

The redundant duplication of political parties is another pathological abnormality explaining the apoplexy of democracy in the D.R. Congo. This form of political scam has been highly developed in the D.R. Congo since the early 1990s. Successive governments had steadily encouraged this severe abnormality since April 24, 1990, when political pluralism was first launched. Currently, there are more than seven-hundred political parties registered in the D.R. Congo, redundant duplication included. However, most of them are suffering from ideological dwarfism around self and short-term interests, incapable to serve as workshops for generating the knowledge needed for development. Over the years, redundant duplication of political parties as a political scam has allowed those who have no rights to benefit from political advantages unfairly. The principle is simple: when a dispute arose, especially before the election period or during the elections, the ruling power creates a fake opposition party 'bis' with the same name, same flags, symbols, and insignia. The objective is to destabilize the real opposition parties and confuse the voters. Similarly, if one or two parties from the majority ruling alliance decide to move from the grouping, the majority ruling alliance bribes one of the party leaders to create a kind of 'faction pro- ruling majority' which in fact, operates as a party 'bis' within the same party breaking the alliance.^x This, in violation of Article 7 of the Law defining 'name' as part of the exclusive identification of legal entity to which it belongs; it cannot be used by more than one person or entity.^{xi}

Finally, in the same vein, political alliances are formed based on circumstances and interests in the total absence of any real social project. This explains, to some extent, the fragility of alliances and vagrancy of political elites shifting from one camp to another based on short term and personal interests outside of any political ethics or ideology. Congolese people describe this as 'political vagrancy,' referring to political elites' behaviour full of debauchery. Fickle political elites, with no convictions, floating anytime, sometimes on conflicting ideologies. Thus, it is not rare to see one political elite moving from the opposition party to the ruling camp, changing ideologies and doctrines from 'Lumumbism' to 'Mobutism,' from Mobutism to Kabilism-father, from Kabilism-father to the Kabilism-son, from the Kabilism-son to Tshisekedism, via the pro-Rwandan R.C.D. Political elites pathologically justify this abnormal culture of political vagrancy, saying people are ignorant. This is a real corruption of morals, presenting the good as evil, the red as black, the woman as a man without changing any structure, and this, in a short time. Politically, such a dishonest and changing attitude pays out. However, it denotes an opportunistic, adventurist, lucrative, and immoral behaviour with a blatant deficit of political pedagogy vis-a-vis to youth.

(4) Ethnicity

In the DR. Congo, political elites create or construct this artificial phenomenon to dominate the unfortunate people and get enriched at the latter's expense. Bayart (2009: 66) sees in this pathological abnormality a consciousness without structure, what this study considers as false consciousness. Ethnicity today has nothing to do with the pre-colonial ethnic groups in Africa. Ethnicity in the D.R. Congo is entirely a socio-political phenomenon mixed from colonization and the post-colonial political professionals. Claims relating to ethnicity are essentially based on modern political and economic advantages. They have nothing to do with culture or parental values. Ethnic claims, and identities in the D.R. Congo often gather momentum during the election and sharing- power period. Generally, unstated but obvious propaganda (Piamme, 1975) and motivating speech are used by political elites to manipulate the people by creating ethnic-driven demands since the former know that narrow mindedness mostly characterizes the latter (Tocqueville, 1882:427). Ethnicity artificially constructed by political elites for political ends constitutes in D.R. Congo an essential impediment to nation-state building and a core element in clearing the ground for balkanization. For instance, Ne-Mwanda Nsemi in the province of Congo Central and Gideon Kyungu in the Haut-Lomami (ex Katanga) have been successfully competing in terms of creating rebellions in some nooks and corners of the State. A similar phenomenon to be observed with the Mai-Mai in the provinces of Kivu and Ituri. The truth is, no efficient solution has ever been found through the aggregative type of ideological discourse even since Mobutu's Era. Evidence to this, Mobutu has had to rely on other legislative elections in Kinshasa to elect the provincial representative reportedly beaten in 1986 at the age of single-party rule by those from Bandundu, Bas Congo, and the Equator. The aim was to seek national representation by artificially combatting the under-representation of many provinces. This demonstrates how robust is the antidemocratic centrifugal logic in political elites' behaviour that increases the centripetal forces of pathological abnormalities leading to the apoplexy of democracy.

In all, the ethnic and tribal particularism in the D.R. Congo feeds on people's poverty, on social injustice, and political elite's strategies in the vast ocean of de-politicization inherent to mass illiteracy. The hiatus between the unitarist political discourse from political elites and their 'supportive' practices to nepotism, clientelism, corruption and ethnicity in political and administrative recruitment is wide. All these anti democratic centrifugal and separatist narrow-mindedness remain to the self-interest of political elites and never be the people's or State's advantage. To access political and economic benefits, political elites fuel ethnicity by adopting a deliberate approach and an extreme divide-and-conquer position. For political elites, this became a strategy of professionalization in political and administrative life to the detriment of competition and rejuvenating the political class. It further explains the presence of persistent ethnic and tribal elements in the names of some political parties and community groups, including 'Conakat', 'Anamongo', 'Abako', etc. As a consequence, the rise of centrifugal violence notably in Kongo-central (ex- Bas-Congo), Kivu, Sankuru, Mai-Ndombe, Katanga, Ituri, etc.

Conclusion and Implications

To echo C. Lutundula (2020), the autocratic and dictatorial regimes known in the D.R. Congo after the independence have not allowed the Congolese political elite's talents to flourish, for them to create spaces for free activities that could allow everyone to work for the good of all and activate the real socio-economic development of the abundantly endowed country with non-renewable resources, whose mining basin, from its geostrategic position is likely to be the hub of the mining industry in Africa and in the world. The subsequent advent of democratization process and political change which followed was long challenged by political elite's patrimonial and clientelistic misconceptions of State and Democracy which since then, long operated under ethnic, tribal, regionalist and clan gravity fuelled by corruption, cronyism, patronage, nepotism, political vagrancy, party duplication, explored in this paper as pathological abnormalities that imbalance weight of centripetal forces remains conducive to the spontaneous loss of democratic values and severe onset of exemplary leadership crisis, namely the apoplexy of democracy explored in this paper in terms of political elite's culture of mediocrity, passivity, incompetence, idleness, opacity, enjoyment, including the non-attachment to general interest, lack of culture of accountability, deficit of culture of effort, of discipline, of efficiency, of excellence and meritocracy, including the inability for establishing, developing and managing a more stable and permanent mechanism to consciously control political elites' behaviour for favouring democratic values, providing to the D.R. Congo with robust political, social, cultural, economic and judicial institutions capable of promoting sustainable development and consolidating its independence.

By attempting to conceptualize the apoplexy of democracy through a theoretical analysis of pathological abnormalities, this article introduced and added Genetic Statenescopy to the ongoing debate on Afrocentric approaches in the study of Sub Saharan Africa's democracies. It described the implications of those pathological abnormalities on the D.R. Congo's democracy, and revealed that the centrifugal logic of democracy in the D.R.

Congo is lopsided by centripetal forces of pathological abnormalities, leading to the apoplexy of democracy and poor government performance.

To decrease the severity of apoplexy resulting in the likely rift and failure of this fragile democracy, and to enhance its capacity of positive government performance and economic success, this study suggested: first, to initiate a robust cultural revolution by creating competitive political elites with new political intelligence, new vision, and new leadership. Not from a spontaneous generation, rather from the one which is formed, transformed and reformed, which is aware that political arena is not the place of rapid and unjust self-enrichment, rather it is all about manufacturing the common good. Secondly, these competitive new political elites should be attentive to the common destiny, combative, demanding and hardworking leaders breaking with naivety, lethargy, unconsciousness to seize and grasp the challenge, and all that straitjacket of pathological abnormalities that have anesthetized the former political elites and which still pulling down the State.

Accountability and transparency should be the core pillar of their actions with multiple consequences, notably transforming the Parliament into a real factory for producing laws and exercising political control over government and administration, in full accordance with Constitution and Laws that would require meticulous review and political reforms to give legitimacy and substantiality to political action that, consequently should become rational, far away from any bickering or discriminatory intention and practice to manipulate identities for political purposes. Lastly, political elites should cease to become kleptocrat-agents of their destiny and stop transforming the State into a predatory tool. They should know that State-building is a joint responsibility, a historical responsibility - responsibility in the present and future-. It implies extensive efforts and everyone's cooperation. Not only efforts of a specific category of persons from the ruling class, clan, or ethnic. State-building is not about dreaming, rather than doing -although ideal precedes action. It is about gathering new synergies, building new convergences and breaking with the false dialectic around short-term and self-interests to finally get an exit from this kind of 'geopolitical vacuum' to a prospective change in the whole society by institutionalizing a system of positive denunciation; limiting the number of term of office to two years for all political institutions –not only for the Presidency-; establishing legislation that prohibit the use of kinship in the management of public affairs; expanding and effectively implementing the legally guaranteed minimum wage; establishing permanent commissions to deal with ill-gotten gains and wilful killing of civilians and political opponents; Sending all political offenders to prison for twenty years with hefty fines and disqualifications from holding public office for ten years in order to address more efficiently the impunity issue; avoiding 'ethno-political struggles for political positioning' and thoroughly review and reform the structure and functioning of judicial institution and the electoral commission including their mode of recruitment.

The judicial system should be reformed based on the people's needs: anybody who participates in the administration of justice should be free from the influence or interference of policymakers, politicians, and social power actors. This does not mean that court officials and Judges should be free to behave as they please. Rather, it would simply emphasize the fact that the issue of justice in the D.R. Congo as it is in most Romano-Germanic legal systems, goes beyond the technical distinction 'judicial-judiciary' assuming that the independence of the judiciary is solely vested in courts, excluding public prosecutors. Far from it. Independence here implies both judicial power and judiciary.

End Notes

ⁱInitially formulated by Nganda Fabrice Enga, combining the terms Genetic and Statenescopy. [see: Nganda Fabrice Enga (forthcoming). 'Genetic Statenescopy' In Lohata Tambwe O. P-R. eds 2 Methodology and Epistemology of Social Science. Logic of Inquiry for Doctoral Research. Kinshasa: Approaches, pp. 110-120. (French version)]

ⁱⁱThe R.R.L. was initiated by Lohata Tambwe O. P-R. and exists for over a decade. It first applied to examine the reinterpretation of the State in Africa and Congo and reveals that the State in Africa is a product of political mixing of multiple influences from the imitation of western political institutions, the weight of the local political traditions (e.g., oral tradition in the decision-making process, nepotism, etc.), plus the political innovation from modern political actors (e.g., special characteristics of the PMR –Popular Movement of the Revolution in Zaire). See Lohata Tambwe O. P-R. (2010) 'La Reinterpretation de l'Etat en Afrique et en Republique Democratique du Congo'. S.S.C.E.P.L.C (French version)

ⁱⁱⁱFor instance, the minister of justice considers that a magistrate is investigating at the same time another file, the minister creates a disciplinary file for the magistrate and instructs his hierarchical authority to sanction him on the

provisional basis, then when the hierarchical authority denies the magistrate's right to act, the latter by the minister's instructions, withdraws the file under the magistrate's investigation (see D. Sesanga, 2020).

^{iv}By questioning whether economic development is conducive to political democracy or whether democracy foster or hinder material welfare, Przeworski & al (2000) in the book *Democracy and Development*, challenge the popular belief that democracy is a luxury that can only be afforded after a difficult process of development. Contrary to Lipset (1959)'s argument that democracies are more likely to emerge a state develops economically, Przeworski & al (2000)'s theory supports that economic development may not cause dictators to collapse, but it does increase the likely hood that a democracy will survive. For instance, the Asian Tigers: not all dictatorships collapsed because of development

^vDR. Congo only had three multi-party elections (in July 2006, in 2011 and December 2018) and one democratic transition of power (January 2019) since it gained the independence in 1960.

^{vi}e.g.: recruited staffs with false qualification, illegal staff promotion with no regards to duration, rating or ranking, much less organizing competitions to recruit officials and other staffs, etc.

^{vii}Civic culture not only as an exogenous and enduring independent variable, a result of a gradual political development, - and not made by socialization or interactions- (see Tocqueville 1835, 1840; Almond & Verba 1963; Putnam 1993; or Inglehart 1977), but also as endogenous byproduct of organizational interactions affected by policies and institutions (see Coleman 1960; or neo-institutionalist approach: Institutions shaped by history -path dependence-, then Institutions shape politics. Rules matter and structure political behaviors)

^{viii}On April 19th 2002, delegates of warring parties in the second Congo war met in Sun City (South-Africa) to sign a partial then a final peace agreement as a result of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue between the DR. Congo's government, the Ugandan-backed movement (MLC) armed opposition group, the Rwandan-backed movement (RCD-Goma) armed group along with unarmed opposition groups, forming the first coalition government of transition with 1 president (from the government) and 4 vice-presidents (1 from each of the 2 armed opposition groups, 1 from the unarmed opposition group and 1 from the government), ending more than 5 years of war.

^{ix}Following recent elections (December 2018), the Common Front for the Congo (F.C.C.), the largest political regrouping closely aligned with the former President Joseph Kabila, took the lion's share holding the majority in both National Assembly 341 out of 500 seats won and Senate 99 out of 109 seats won. not to mention that all 26 provincial assemblies and local governments are controlled by the F.C.C., the former ruling power. This limited the ability of the elected President Felix Tshisekedi and former opponent to govern with his minority political alliance named Heading for Change (CACH) and, thereby pushed him to negotiate with the F.C.C. an alliance that agreed on forming a de jure coalition government, yet in realty operates as a de facto cohabitation within a premier-presidential model of the semi-presidential regime (Aberg and Sedlius, 2016) with a cabinet of 65 members whom 44 members including the prime minister belong to F.C.C. controlling Defence, Justice, and Finance.

^xIt happened to parties like Christian Democrat Party (PDC) of Jose Endundo; National Union for the Congo's Federalists (UNAFEC) of Gabriel Kyungu Wa-Kumwanza; Alliance for the Congo's Renewal (A.R.C.) of Olivier Kamitatu; National Union of Federalist Democrats (UNADEF) of Christian Mwando Simba; Social Movement for Renewal (M.S.R.) of Pierre Lumbi Okongo; Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) of Etienne Tshisekedi; and the recent case of AFDC-A of Modest Bahati Lukwebo among others.

^{xi}'Under penalty of Law, no political party can adopt the name, acronym, abbreviations, logos, or symbols and distinctive signs of another political party previously registered by the competent public authority' (see: Art7 of Law No. 04/002 of March 15 2004 on Organization and Operation of Political Parties in the D.R. Congo).

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Author(s) Biography

Nganda Fabrice Enga

PhD candidate, Department of Politics, Institute of China and Asia-Pacific Studies, College of Social Sciences, National Sun Yat-sen University, 70 Lien-hai Road, Kaohsiung City 804, Taiwan (ROC). He received his MA in Public Administration from Daegu University (South Korea) in 2018, and his BA in Political Science from Université de Goma (D.R. Congo) in 2010 and served as Lecturer in D.R. Congo and Researcher in Korea and Taiwan. His research interests include International Security, US-China-Africa Relations, Soft Power and Public diplomacy, Asia-Pacific Studies, African Politics and Democracies, Ubiquitous and Electronic Government, Public Administration and Policy, Electoral Studies and Comparative Politics.

Lohata Tambwe O. Paul-René

Director and Distinguished Professor, Graduate Institute of Political Science and Public Administration, College of Social Sciences, Université Libre de Kinshasa (ULK), 15e Rue Limete, Kinshasa, D.R. Congo. He received his PhD in Political Science from the University of Picardie Jules Verne (France) in 1990. He has long been teaching in several Graduate School of Political Science in DR. Congo including and not limited to Université de Kinshasa (UNIKIN); Université Libre de Kinshasa (ULK) & Institut Supérieur des Techniques Médicales (ISTM)/ Kinshasa. Ever since 1990 he has published several refereed journal articles and books, the most recent of which: *Methodology and epistemology of social science. Logic of inquiry for doctoral research. Kinshasa: Approaches*, eds. 1 (2021, in French). His teaching and research interests include Political Science, Administrative Law, Research Methods and Methodology. He is the Editor in Chief of the Academic Journal Approach (SSCEPLC), D.R. Congo.